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interpretation is a sad legacy of people like Simms that should not be swept 
under the rug. 
Similarly, Guilds has high praise for William Gilmore Simms's 
portrayal, in the Sack and Destruction of the City of Columbia, S.C. (1865) 
of the arrival of General William T. Sherman and his Unionist troops. 
Simms, who had fled to Columbia as a safe haven from his plantation and 
who compared Sherman's forces to Huns and Vandals, presented a vivid 
and potent-but extremely one-sided-picture of the Yankees, who, in 
addition to other depredations, supposedly prevented local firemen from 
putting out the fire that ravaged the city. This legend of the ruthlessness and 
indifference of the Yankees to human suffering played a powerful role in 
the origins and perpetuation of the "Lost Cause" mythology that united 
white southerners for generations to come in romanticizing the Old South 
and the Confederacy, especially its military leaders. This mythology 
provided the intellectual and moral basis for the racist and reactionary 
regimes that ruled the South for so many years after the Civil War. 
Marion Brunson Lucas, in Sherman and the Burning of Columbia 
(1976), developed a much more balanced and multi-causal explanation of 
the events surrounding the burning of Columbia that repudiates the 
Yankees-blocking-the-firemen story and places Simms's other allegations 
in a broader context. Lucas's work had been widely accepted as the 
definitive study of this topic. Nevertheless, Guilds completely ignores 
Lucas's book and makes extravagant claims about Simms as a historian. 
According to Guilds, Simms's "presence in the city and credibility as a 
historian lend substance to his depiction" (31). Based on this line of 
thinking, Guilds concludes that Simms "is particularly valuable in his 
importance to both historians and literary scholars" (35). 
It seems obvious that Guilds has fallen into a prevalent pitfall for 
scholars who spend many years working on one subject: batten down the 
hatches and defend your man against all comers 
Robert M. Saunders is an independent scholar who has just published a 
book entitled Power, the Presidency, and the Preamble: Interpretive 
Essays on Selected Presidents of the United States (2001). 
Mr. Polk's Army: The American Military Experience in the Mexican 
War. By Richard Bruce Winders. (College Station: Texas A & M 
University Press, 1997. Pp. xvi, 284. Illustrations. Paper, $17.95.) 
Texas A&M Press has recently issued Richard Bruce Winder's 1997 study 
of America's Mexican War army in paperback. In Mr. Polk's Army, the 
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author deals with two main topics: the partisan politics of military 
appointment and the democratic spirit of the American troops led by James 
K. Polk's many appointees. 
Winders is clearly most interested in the relationship between partisan 
politics and the officer selections of the Polk administration. The author 
reminds us early that the secretary of war, William Marcy, had previously 
gained national notice with an 1832 Senate speech vigorously asserting that 
"to the victor belong the spoils" (16). The book then proceeds to develop 
in great detail the evidence for a similar emphasis upon partisan advantage 
in the 1846-1848 officer corps. 
Once he has built his case for Democratic leadership of the officer 
corps, Winders makes a more impressionistic case for democratic spirit 
among the enlisted men. This is clearly the topic Winders most enjoyed 
researching. His narrative quickens and his examples sparkle as he draws 
upon both major and minor campaigns from Texas to California to illustrate 
common behavioral features of the enlisted soldier. Concentrating upon 
recruitment, training, and camp life, the book argues for an egalitarian spirit 
in everything from discipline to costume. Combat, which might serve as a 
test of such ideals as courage, loyalty, and initiative is, however, largely 
ignored. 
Winders's army is no monolith. Both regulars and volunteers fought 
in the war, and the author makes a clear and lucid explanation of the 
background and organization of each group. He points out that the war 
benefited each in quite separate ways. For the regulars, the war allowed a 
purge of many tired, overage generals and the recruitment and training of 
more motivated enlisted men. For the volunteers, many of whom never saw 
battle, the war offered an initial burst of excitement that often yielded to 
boredom and indiscipline. 
Winders's army is also transitional. In detailing its weaponry, dress, 
organization, drill, and tactics, he portrays an institution abandoning the 
memories of the War of 1812 era for a more fluid, industrial, and irregular 
style that will look fairly familiar to Civil War buffs. But no such transition 
appears in such matters as diet, camp sanitation, and medical expertise, and 
the author offers a case that the Mexican War may, proportionate to 
numbers committed, have been the deadliest of America's wars. If Polk 
raised a winning army, he raised it at a high price. 
Contemporary perceptions of ethnicity often color our view of the war, 
particularly with regard to the role played by Irish immigrants. Winders 
acknowledges such issues as the American treatment of the Irish deserters 
who were punished for joining Mexico's San Patricio battalion. His main 
focus, however, is upon attitudes of U. S. soldiers toward the Mexican 
people themselves. It comes as little surprise to learn that views of 
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American political, cultural, and racial superiority enjoyed wide support 
among the troops. Such views go far to explaining the widespread 
indignities heaped upon civilians in the occupied regions. 
Winders relies extensively upon published sources, paying less 
attention to manuscript letters and diaries. At times the result is more a 
picture of what officers thought about the men's behavior than it is of what 
the men thought of themselves. Given the tendency of many officers, 
especially regulars, to differentiate themselves from the soldiers they lead, 
this can result in a more traditional overview than Winders intended. 
Winders also might have been more convincing in his treatment of the 
common soldier if he had more clearly distinguished between the two main 
armies of the war. By comparing the one raised in 1846, which served under 
Taylor in northern Mexico, with the other raised in considerable part in 
1847, which served with Scott in central Mexico, Winders might have 
highlighted considerable differences. He would certainly have had a better 
chance to evaluate the performances of the two very individual Whig 
generals, Zachary "Rough and Ready" Taylor and Winfield "Fuss and 
Feathers" Scott. From this, Winders might have built a stronger answer to 
the question of how any Whig general could derive a strong military 
performance from an army that he pictures in political dissonance with their 
commanders. The differences might also lead to a review of the fighting 
styles of the two armies. Winders does not treat operations and combat in 
detail, and thus avoids the "face of battle" approach in his study. But it 
would be interesting to ask if Taylor's improvisational victories, such as 
Buena Vista, reflect the qualities of a body of troops different from those 
that Scott led on the road to Mexico City. 
Certainly two types of democracy-political and social-sit 
uncomfortably in separate chapters of the book, and probably sat as 
uncomfortably with many of the men. It's hard to find the same kind of 
rough affection for many of Polk's appointed officers as the men clearly 
had for the Whig generals, Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor, who were 
so often the target of Polk's suspicion and concern. It's also hard to 
understand from Winders's analysis why Franklin Pierce, alone among 
Polk's appointees, was able to transfer his wartime performance into a 
successful presidential bid. Much of the problem probably lies in 
Winders's sources, which stress the accounts of officers and the diaries of 
literate volunteers. It's hard to hear the inarticulate, but this book certainly 
shows us that such questions are rewarding to ask. 
George W. Geib is Distinguished Professor of Liberal Arts at Butler 
University. His research interests include the frontier militias of the early 
republic. 
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